Brexit
A Man Needs
February 26, 2023
The Poor U.K
March 5, 2023Brexit Where Did All Go Wrong?
As documented by the Independent Commission on Referendums, the usage of referendums in British politics has increased, yet they can conflict with conventional parliamentary sovereignty.
Throughout a lengthy period, (perhaps ironically) arguments for referendums on subjects involving EU powers were advanced on the grounds of defending this same sovereignty.
The 2016 EU referendum – which David Cameron eventually conceded under pressure from Conservative Euroskeptics and UKIP – was highly exceptional in two significant aspects.
First, it was what the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (chaired by prominent Brexit supporter Bernard Jenkin) criticized as a ‘bluff-call’ referendum, in which the government’s intention was not to seek approval for a change that it supported, but rather to thwart its opponents’ demands.
Second, the referendum was conducted on the basis of a broad proposition (to leave the EU) rather than a specific prospectus.
So, when the outcome was not what the Prime Minister or the majority of MPs (even on the Tory benches at the time) desired, it was up to the legislature to determine how to implement it.
In such conditions, tensions between legislative and popular sovereignty were manifest.
Divided parties
The most important obstacle, which led to the referendum itself, was the Conservative Party’s internal discord.
This was never acknowledged publicly by Theresa May, who took out her frustrations on an undifferentiated ‘parliament’ or the opposition instead of her own backbenchers — on whose support a prime minister should typically be able to rely.
In the initial January 2019 vote on her withdrawal agreement, 118 Conservatives broke the party whip.
75 did so on the second occasion.
Even on the third occasion, on the original “Brexit day” of March 29, 2019, 34 Conservative MPs dissented, resulting in the deal’s rejection by a vote of 344 to 282.
Note, 28 of these rebels were staunch Euroskeptics as opposed to Brexit opponents.
If they and the pro-Brexit DUP had supported her proposal, it would have passed.
Given the minority government scenario, it should have been immediately apparent to the Prime Minister that the deal was doomed to fail; in July 2018, several Brexit supporters, including David Davis and Boris Johnson, had resigned from her Cabinet in protest.
But she made no effort to adapt her plan and build an alternative cross-party majority in the legislature.
A additional issue was Labour’s internal divisions: as leader, Jeremy Corbyn was more sympathetic to Brexit than the majority of his MPs, whose support he could not guarantee.
The conventional idea at Westminster, as in most modern parliaments, is that governments construct parliamentary majorities by agreements between stable party blocs.
Yet, neither the Conservative nor Labour blocs were stable.
“Parliament against the people” – the decline into populism
Once Theresa May was thrown out of office, the aforementioned four factors contributed to an increasingly adversarial and hostile environment inside and outside of parliament, paving the way for the beginning of Boris Johnson’s premiership.
In July 2019, Johnson won the Conservative leadership election just one day before the lengthy summer break.
Throughout the summer, there was widespread discussion of additional rebel actions to prevent a “no deal” Brexit, as well as a vote of no confidence and the establishment of an alternative “unity” administration.
On the 28th of August, the day before parliament was scheduled to return, it was revealed that Johnson had sought the Queen for a five-week prorogation, which was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court.
In the brief time preceding this “non-prorogation,” lawmakers passed the Benn-Burt Act, mandating an Article 50 extension until January 31, 2020.
During this time, anti-parliamentary rhetoric, which had previously been fueled by Theresa May, grew more virulent, including the Attorney General’s above-quoted remarks.
May herself was severely criticised for a Downing Street statement following the failure of her plan in which she attempted to put herself on the public’s side against the MPs by claiming, “I am on your side.”
This had evident populist undertones, which characterises society as divided between a “pure people” and a “corrupt elite.”
The main Parliamentarians that denied May a majority were, of course, Conservative backbenchers, including Boris Johnson.
Nonetheless, his own administration persisted with and escalated the anti-parliamentary charges.
When launching the general election campaign in November 2019, Johnson claimed that “our MPs are repeatedly refusing to deliver Brexit and honour the will of the people.”
This was reiterated in the Tory manifesto, which criticised “the inability of Parliament to implement Brexit” and “the dedication of so many MPs to subverting the democratic will of the British people.”
minority administration
Prime Minister David Cameron announced his resignation the morning following the referendum, and was succeeded by Theresa May.
In 2015, despite widespread predictions of a hung parliament, the government surprisingly won a slim majority in the Commons.
This created a challenging situation for implementing a significant controversial policy.
As usual, the backbenchers of the Prime Minister’s own party were the most important group for her to consider and retain on her side.
Yet (as will be addressed in greater detail below), the Conservative party in parliament was bitterly divided.
Having obtained (with relative ease) the legislation to activate Article 50, May proposed a snap general election in an attempt to increase her majority.
Nonetheless, the outcome was a hung parliament, which resulted in a minority administration and a confidence and supply agreement with the Northern Ireland DUP.
Parliament, unlike many other parliaments, is unfamiliar with minority governments and proved incapable of meeting the challenge.
First, it would have been reasonable for May to scale back her policy goals, focusing on less divisive issues on which she could count on parliamentary support.
In accordance with Article 50, she was had to have a Brexit agreement ratified within two years.
May was fundamentally unfit to manage a minority administration, which demands a consensus-building style, respect for parliament, and a desire to collaborate across parties.
In contrast, Seldon and Newell note that May was notorious for her “obstinacy” and “tribalism.”
Prior to the election, she established’red lines’ on Brexit in order to maintain the support of her Euroskeptic backbenchers; she did not allow shifting circumstances to alter her plan.
The violation of parliamentary regulations
As time progressed, questions grew as to whether an alternative parliamentary majority might be negotiated by other legislators.
The rules of the House of Commons made this difficult, given the government has comparative control over the agenda.
The ‘Wright committee’ advocated the establishment of a bipartisan ‘House Business Committee’ in 2009, which could have been helpful, but this was never implemented.
So, while members of parliament may pose questions to the administration in select committees and the chamber, they had limited power to influence decisions.
The Prime Minister postponed crucial votes and bided time, which was quickly running out.
This prompted members of parliament to attempt to “seize the agenda” to promote “indicative votes” on the Brexit choices.
Yet, without the traditional organisation of whips and leaders and with few incentives to compromise, these legislators became indecisive.
Lawmakers largely concurred in their wish to prevent a “no deal” exit.
This resulted in the unusual use of private members’ bills (the so-called “Cooper-Letwin” and “Benn-Burt” measures) to force the government to seek Article 50 prolongation.
Yet, it generated considerable debate, notably over the Speaker’s role.
These changes sparked additional disputes on sovereignty, this time encompassing the definition of “parliamentary” sovereignty itself.
For some, particularly under minority government,
it was appropriate for the majority of the legislature to have the last say.
Others held a ‘Whitehall’ conception of parliamentary sovereignty, according to which the executive (or ‘crown-in-parliament’) should instead wield authority.
The irony was that prominent Eurosceptic proponents of this viewpoint had pushed to thwart the government’s agenda, preferring a “no deal” scenario – which the Prime Minister and the parliamentary majority were attempting to avoid.
What occurred, and where do we go from here?
The referendum, minority government, a divided Conservative Party, and the inability of parliamentary rules to adapt to a minority situation all contributed, in interrelated ways, to the “perfect storm” that caused the UK executive to pit itself more and more explicitly against parliament over Brexit, I have argued.
All of this contributed to discontent and paved the way for Boris Johnson’s “people versus parliament” speech.
His predecessor, and interestingly enough, even the Labour leader, never stressed the fact that he and his colleagues had been part of the blocking majority during previous stages.
Ultimately, the result of a ‘bluff-call’ referendum prompted by splits in the Conservative Party repeatedly failed to be delivered, due to persistent disagreements in the Conservative Party – and the party’s leaders increasingly blamed parliament.
Although these debates may now seem distant, they have unavoidably left their mark on our politics.
Parliament is vital to every democracy, and even more so in the United Kingdom, where it is the ultimate authority.
Lack of confidence in the legislative branch weakens democracy itself.
During the current situation, in which the government has been granted unprecedented emergency powers, political trust and robust parliamentary oversight of political decision-making are of utmost importance.
The Conservative manifesto pledged the establishment of a “Constitution, Democracy, and Rights Commission” charged with examining “the relationship between the Government, Parliament, and the courts.”
With the Covid-19 scenario, it is uncertain what will become of this commitment.
Regardless of what else may occur, it is now imperative that concerted measures be made to rebuild confidence in parliament.
G.I.T.C
iliasro
Was born on the Bajora planet is the ninth planet after the sun it will take 8 light years to reach my planet which means you never going to make it with today's technology. I moved to earth due to ecological problems on my planet. Thought earth will be a better place but to my surprise, it is not. The stupidity those people have is unbelievable and that inspire me to write a couple of books on humanity and their stupidity. After years of travelling around the planet, I decided to live in this town which is across the sea from the mainland. Here the level of stupidity is higher and that is good because I sell more books
